Protestant Scholastic Argument Against Transubstantiation Refuted

THE PROTESTANT SCHOLASTIC ARGUMENT AGAINST TRANSUBSTANTIATION BY INHERENCE OF ACCIDENTS REFUTED

OBJECTION: It is commonly objected against transubstantiation that it is metaphysically impossible due to the fact that it posits that accidents inhere without a subject (cf., Mirae Caritatis, n. 7), which seems to be of the essence of an accident.

The argument runs thus: To be an accident is to be such a being as to inhere in a subject. Yet, it is posited by Transubstantiation that there are accidents which exist without inherence in a subject (sine subiecto). Therefore, Transubstantiation posits a contradiction, i.e., that that which inheres in a subject exists without inherence in a subject.

DIRECT REPLY: I distinguish the major. To be an accident according to the common notion is to actually inhere in a subject, denied, to possess the referentiality of inherence and, therefore, either actually or aptitudinally, conceded.

I contradistinguish the minor (and thus show the equivocation). It is posited by Transubstantiation that there are accidents which exist without actual inherence in a subject, I subdistinguish, those accidents which, according to their general notion require actual inherence (such as whiteness and the like), denied, those accidents which, according to their general notion are sufficiently individuated by aptitudinal inherence (such as dimensive quantity), conceded. Otherwise, denied.

EXPLANATION: There are ten common genera of things (categories). One of these is called "substance," the other nine are called "accident." Accident does not represent a univocal term, but an analogous term (otherwise, there would only be two common genera, substance and accident). The common analogate that is shared by these nine accidents is called "inherence." Inherence is like a certain relation (i.e., insofar as it is referential). Now, that which is referential does not necessarily require the existence of the terminus to which it refers since it simply indicates the order of one to another which does not depend on the existence of the other, e.g., at the annihilation of one's father, a man would still have the relation of sonship, i.e., he would not cease to be the son of such and such a man. This reference is said to be actual with the actual existence of the terminus and aptitudinal if one simply retains the order after the terminus ceases to exist. In the same way, one can think of inherence. On the one hand, a certain accident may actually inhere in a certain subject and thus the reference actually terminates (just as if the father exists to which the son is related) or the certain accident may aptitudinally inhere in a certain subject and thus the reference aptitudinal terminates, i.e., retains an order towards termination (just as if the father ceases to exist and the son retains his order as one generated).

Therefore, it is evident from the common notion of an accident as "that which inheres" that there is no difficulty present since that which refers can terminate either actually or aptitudinally.

Yet, there is a second difficulty that is presented in the subdistinction above. There is not only the analogous notion of accident, there is also a generic notion of each accident. Thus, there are certain genera of accidents (e.g., whiteness) that cannot be considered as separate from individual and actual inherence. For, if we were to remove whiteness from inherence, it would be a simple form, which is against the very notion of color, which requires that it inhere in a body. This difficulty is easily resolve when we turn our eyes to the accident of dimensive quantity which, due to its materiality, is sufficient to individuate itself. Thus, according to its generic notion, it does not require actual inherence, but remains sufficiently individuated even without actual inherence. Therefore, we say that those accidents that require actual inherence actually inhere in dimensive quantity (cf., QVII.Q4.A3). Thus, there is no contradiction present.

EDIT: On Twitter, the Protestant Matt Hedges wrote a reply to this article which I believe merits a response on the basis of its intrinsic quality.

In this reply, he found my response to be unusual among Thomistic authors that he had read on the matter due to my frequent use of the term "relation" in reference to aptitude, citing the great Cajetan in his comment that "the opinion of Thomists is that aptitudinal inherence is of the essence of accidents and that it is not a relation." I thank Mr. Hedges for giving me an opportunity to clarify myself. When I refered in this article to inherence as a "relation" I was simply taking the term in its broader sense of "that which refers to another" or the "referrential" rather than indicating that inherence is of the genus of relation properly speaking. I have edited this article to clarify in greater detail this distinction. It is important to note that the use of the term "relation" in the way I used it is not unique, as can even be seen from the quote that Mr. Hedges brings forward from Gerhard.

It the quote from Cajetan that was brought forward, he is answering an objection of the Scotists about the definition of accidents. The Scotists attempted to deny that inherence of any kind was of the essence of an absolute accident. The Scotists argued that, since the absolute accidents were absolute, a relation could not enter into their definitions. Now, inherence is a relation. Therefore, etc.

Cajetan responds by distinguishing two things. First, he distinguished between inherence which is actual and inherence which is aptitudinal. Actual inherence represents a certain mode whereby a reference actually terminates in its terminus. Aptitudinal inherence represents a certain mode whereby a reference is ordered towards such termination, yet does not actually terminate.

As a side note, this is a distinction which I believe Mr. Hedges failed to grasp at points in his response. For, Mr. Hedges' general argument seems to assume that aptitudinal inherence (as the name may seem to indicate) represents a certain potentiality on the part of the act, yet such is not the case. Rather, aptitudinal inherence represents a certain distinct mode of act in consideration of the terminus of such an act. Hence, it is not, properly speaking, potential, but only could be said to be such on the part of the "object." To give an analogy, let's say we were considering the love of a man for his wife. We could consider this love in three states. First, as potential, i.e., he could love but does not love. Second, as aptitudinal, i.e., he loves his wife, but she is zapped out of existence as the object in which the love terminates. Third, as actual, i.e., he loves his wife and she truly exists to be loved as an object. Now, I of course know that such a state of affairs in not possible for psychological acts (for, she would still exist intentionally and hence the act would still terminate in the object as understood), yet the analogy is still helpful in attempting to understand how aptitude is actual order.

Second, he distinguished between a relation as that which is in the genus of relation and the referential. The first indicates that which refers to a distinct subject and implies relative opposition. The second is a more general term that indicates reference, whether to oneself or to a distinct subject. Hence "reference" or "referential" indicate a more general concept than "relation," although, as stated above, the terms can be used interchanageably. This, of course, demolishes Scotus' argument since something can have reference to itself and hence this can enter into the defintiion of absolute accidents, whereas something cannot have (a real) relation to itself since a relation brings above relative opposition. From this, we are able to see how the response of Mr. Hedges falls flat. He writes "the example Wagner gives of a relation continuing to exist despite the cessation of the terminus (a son and his deceased father) conflates the two categories which Cajetan explicitly makes separate..." As stated above, reference and proper relation are related as a more general and more particular term. Hence, proper relations have reference in common with the referential and are distinguished from it insofar as the proper relation adds to the notion in that that which is in the genus of relation brings about some sort of relative opposition (insofar as it "terminates as a terminus").

Hence, if I were to properly argue by way of analogy, I would need to ask whether my analogy is analogous to the case insofar as the referential and proper relation are united or insofar as proper relation is distinct from the referential. Is the formal reason for the capacity of proper relations to be able to continue with the cessation of its terminus due to the fact that it involves some sort of opposition or is it due to some other reason which is shared in common with the referential. To give an analogy, if I were to argue from some attribute that brutes have to a conclusion about men, I would need to ask, is such and such an attribute one which men and brutes share in common in sharing the genus of animal, or is it something whose formal reason derives from its specific difference. To give a further example, if I were to argue from some attribute in a certain man to a conclusion about all men, I would be right in asking whether the formal reason for such an attribute derives from his specific nature as man, or if it derives from his distinct attributes as this man. I could multiply examples, but it should be plain to the impartial reader that it is simply not enough for Mr. Hedges to point to a distinction between the referential and proper relations in order to say that such analogous reasoning is improper (which, truly, would destroy all theology!)

Now, to the question itself. Does the possibility of the continued reference to a terminus have its formal reason in the relative oppositon had in the genus of relation or is it on the basis of the nature of the referential as such? I would unequivocally say that it is the later. For, when we look at to-be-toward and to-be-in, what is had in common is that the to-be shares some sort of reference, whether to a subject or to a terminus which terminates. Now, such reference consists in some sort of order brought about by an act as its foundation, whether such an order is to a subject or to a terminus which terminates. Yet, the order brought about by the act neither depends on the subject or the terminus that terminates, but continues even at the ceasing of the terminus. For, order is not essentially dependent on the terminus, but on the act that orders to the terminus. As an example, think of a line that terminates in a certain point. Let's say we removed the point. Would not the line still retain the order toward the point from the act of drawing that provides the foundation for the reference? The entire argument of Mr. Hedges turns our concept of reference on its head, placing the foundation for the reference in the terminus rather than the act which is ordered towards the terminus. Thus, in the example given originally, it is the act of generation that is the foundation for the order of the father toward the son that we call the relation of paternity. The reason why there is a separability of the reference from its terminus does not have to do with the presence of those distinguishing factors of a relation, but due to the fact that the reference is founded on the ordering act rather than the terminus, as is the case in all references.