Protestant Scholastic Argument Against Transubstantiation Refuted

THE PROTESTANT SCHOLASTIC ARGUMENT AGAINST TRANSUBSTANTIATION BY INHERENCE OF ACCIDENTS REFUTED

OBJECTION: It is commonly objected against transubstantiation that it is metaphysically impossible due to the fact that it posits that accidents inhere without a subject (cf., Mirae Caritatis, n. 7), which seems to be of the essence of an accident.

The argument runs thus: To be an accident is to be such a being as to inhere in a subject. Yet, it is posited by Transubstantiation that there are accidents which exist without inherence in a subject (sine subiecto). Therefore, Transubstantiation posits a contradiction, i.e., that that which inheres in a subject exists without inherence in a subject.

DIRECT REPLY: I distinguish the major. To be an accident according to the common notion is to actually inhere in a subject, denied, to possess the relation of inherence and, therefore, either actually or aptitudinally, conceded.

I contradistinguish the minor (and thus show the equivocation). It is posited by Transubstantiation that there are accidents which exist without actual inherence in a subject, I subdistinguish, those accidents which, according to their general notion require actual inherence (such as whiteness and the like), denied, those accidents which, according to their general notion are sufficiently individuated by aptitudinal inherence (such as dimensive quantity), conceded. Otherwise, denied.

EXPLANATION: There are ten common genera of things (categories). One of these is called "substance," the other nine are called "accident." Accident does not represent a univocal term, but an analogous term (otherwise, there would only be two common genera, substance and accident). The common analogate that is shared by these nine accidents is called "inherence." Inherence is a certain relation. Now, relation does not necessarily require the existence of the terminus of the relation since it simply indicates the order of one to another which does not depend on the existence of the other, e.g., at the annihilation of one's father, a man would still have the relation of sonship, i.e., he would not cease to be the son of such and such a man. This relation is said to be actual with the actual existence of the terminus and aptitudinal if one simply retains the order after the terminus ceases to exist. In the same way, one can think of inherence. On the one hand, a certain accident may actually inhere in a certain subject and thus the relation is actual (just as if the father exists to which the son is related) or the certain accident may aptitudinally inhere in a certain subject and thus the relation is aptitudinal (just as if the father ceases to exist and the son retains his order as one generated).

Therefore, it is evident from the common notion of an accident as "that which inheres" that there is no difficulty present since relations can be present in either actually or aptitudinally.

Yet, there is a second difficulty that is presented in the subdistinction above. There is not only the analogous notion of accident, there is also a generic notion of each accident. Thus, there are certain genera of accidents (e.g., whiteness) that cannot be considered as separate from individual and actual inherence. For, if we were to remove whiteness from inherence, it would be a simple form, which is against the very notion of color, which requires that it inhere in a body. This difficulty is easily resolve when we turn our eyes to the accident of dimensive quantity which, due to its materiality, is sufficient to individuate itself. Thus, according to its generic notion, it does not require actual inherence, but remains sufficiently individuated even without actual inherence. Therefore, we say that those accidents that require actual inherence actually inhere in dimensive quantity (cf., QVII.Q4.A3). Thus, there is no contradiction present.